During this meeting Ludo presented Thomas Schelling's spatial proximity model from the book Micromotives and macrobehavior (Norton & Company, 1978), and demonstrated his own applet.
These are some of the questions raised by the participants of the discussion:
- Can we construct a set of individual rules which would lead to a wanted distribution?
- How do we construct complementary rules that lead from segregation to mixing?
- In the model there are only two groups of different preferences. What would happen if some heterogeneity is introduced within the group, e.g. some people are more tolerant of (or even demanding for) people of different kind around?
- What would change if an asynchronous simulation is used? Which implementation choices should be made (e.g. modeling race condition in one thread vs. multiple threads)? Which individual rules would then be used? Would it affect the final result of segregation?
- Are the main findings robust with respect to various implementation choices? For example, there are many ways for choosing dissatisfied people to move (e.g. randomly). According to Schelling these choices do not affect the segregation, but it should be checked in a more thorough way.
This is an interesting page where one can find a link for the implementation of the model in NetLogo (with source code). There is also a link to the extension of the Schelling model by sociologists Burch and Mare, which says (according to abstract) that Schelling’s results are not supported when other (more plausible) preferences are introduced:
http://hsd.soc.cornell.edu/Segregation.htm
This paper by Vinkovic and Kirman examines the shape of the segregated areas using the concept of surface tension force from the physics of liquid:
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/103/51/19261
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